

Evaluating the Effectiveness of Security Governance Frameworks in Controlling Cross-Border Organised Crime: Evidence from Seme and Idi-Roko Borders, Nigeria 2020-2025

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Abstract

Cross-border organised crime remains a significant and persistent threat to Nigeria's national security and economic stability, with its effects most pronounced at the Seme and Idi-Roko land borders linking Nigeria to the Republic of Benin. These border corridors facilitate extensive commercial and human movement, but they also provide strategic opportunities for organised criminal networks involved in smuggling, human trafficking, and the movement of illicit goods. This study evaluates the effectiveness of existing security governance frameworks in controlling organised crime at these border points. With the help

of secondary data, the research draws on analysis of secondary crime data, and evidence from field studies. The findings indicate that despite the existence of inter-agency governance arrangements, organised criminal activities remain widespread, undermining border control efforts. Key challenges include overlapping institutional mandates, inadequate resources, weak intelligence sharing, and coordination gaps among security agencies. The paper makes policy recommendations aimed at strengthening inter-agency coordination, improving data integration, and enhancing real-time surveillance, thereby contributing to both academic and policy debates on border security governance in Nigeria.

Keywords: Border security, Cross-border organised crime, Governance frameworks, Securitisation theory, Security governance

1. Introduction

Cross-border organised crime encompassing smuggling of goods, human trafficking, arms trafficking, and other forms of illicit transnational trade poses a persistent challenge to Nigeria's national security, economic development, and state authority, particularly along its land borders. The Seme border in Lagos State and the Idi-Roko border in Ogun State, both linking Nigeria with the Republic of Benin, occupy strategic positions within regional trade and mobility networks in West Africa. Their high traffic volumes, extensive informal crossing points, and historically weak border infrastructure have made them attractive corridors for organised criminal networks operating across national boundaries (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2021). Empirical evidence

underscores the magnitude of the problem. Operational data from the Nigeria Customs Service indicate that the Badagry–Seme corridor alone accounted for approximately 35 per cent of detected petroleum product smuggling in 2024, reflecting the scale and economic implications of illicit activities in the area (Nigerian Customs Service, 2024).

In response to these threats, Nigeria has adopted a security governance approach that relies on multi-agency collaboration among institutions such as the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), the Nigeria Police Force, and other security actors. These frameworks are intended to enhance coordination, intelligence sharing, and operational effectiveness at border points. However, despite the existence of these arrangements, organised crime remains entrenched at Seme and Idi-Roko. Studies consistently point to persistent smuggling routes, human trafficking networks, and the circulation of contraband goods, suggesting a disconnect between formal governance structures and actual security outcomes (Jimba et al., 2023; Oladejo, 2022). Overlapping institutional mandates, limited resources, corruption, and weak inter-agency coordination have been identified as key factors undermining effective border governance (Adekanye, 2019).

Against this background, the central problem addressed in this study is the apparent inability of existing security governance frameworks to significantly reduce cross-border organised crime at Seme and Idi-Roko, despite sustained policy attention and institutional presence. This raises critical questions about how governance arrangements function in practice, the extent to which coordination mechanisms translate into effective enforcement, and why criminal networks continue to adapt and thrive.

Accordingly, the study presents the following research question: How effective are existing security governance frameworks in controlling cross-border organised crime at the Seme and Idi-Roko borders? The analysis is situated within governance theory and securitisation theory, which together provide tools for examining institutional design, coordination dynamics, and the prioritisation of security threats within state practice (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998; Krahmann, 2003).

Methodologically, the study adopts a *expo facto* research design to capture both institutional processes and empirical crime patterns at the two border posts. Data were drawn from secondary data, including official crime statistics, seizure records, policy documents, and peer-reviewed empirical studies on trans-border crime in Nigeria. Secondary data were analysed thematically, illustrate crime trends and enforcement outcomes.

2. Conceptual and Theoretical Issues

Cross-Border Organised Crime

Cross-border organised crime refers to structured and coordinated criminal activities that operate across national boundaries, exploiting differences in legal systems, enforcement capacity, and border controls (UNODC, 2023). These activities are typically carried out by organised networks rather than isolated individuals and are sustained through transnational linkages, corruption, and logistical sophistication. At international frontiers, organised crime thrives where borders are porous, governance capacity is weak, and informal economic activities are widespread (Aning & Abdallah, 2022).

In the Nigerian context, cross-border organised crime manifests prominently through the smuggling of petroleum products, small arms and light weapons, vehicles, counterfeit goods, and agricultural produce, as well as human trafficking and migrant smuggling (UNODC, 2023; World Bank, 2022). The Seme and Idi-Roko borders have been repeatedly identified as major transit points for these illicit flows due to their strategic location along regional trade routes linking Nigeria with Benin and the wider ECOWAS sub-region. Empirical studies show that fuel smuggling alone accounts for substantial revenue losses to the Nigerian state, while arms trafficking and human trafficking directly undermine internal security and social stability (Jimba et al., 2023).

Beyond economic losses, cross-border organised crime contributes to the entrenchment of criminal networks, weakens public trust in state institutions, and fuels violence and insecurity in border communities (Adekanye & Aremu, 2021). These dynamics underscore the need for effective governance responses capable of addressing both the structural drivers and operational patterns of organised crime at border points.

Security Governance Frameworks

Security governance refers to the constellation of institutions, rules, actors, and processes through which security threats are identified, prioritised, and managed within and across states (Krahmann, 2003; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2022). Unlike traditional state-centric security models, security governance emphasises coordination among multiple actors, including state agencies, regional bodies, and, in some cases, non-state stakeholders. In border security contexts, governance frameworks are expected to integrate policy direction with operational

enforcement through clearly defined roles, accountability mechanisms, and information-sharing systems.

In Nigeria, border security governance is built around inter-agency collaboration involving the Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, the Nigeria Police Force, NAPTIP, and other security agencies, supported by legal instruments such as the Customs and Excise Management Act and anti-trafficking legislation. These frameworks are designed to promote intelligence sharing, joint operations, and coordinated enforcement against cross-border crime (Ewi & Aning, 2021). However, empirical evidence suggests that implementation often falls short of policy intent. Studies highlight persistent challenges including overlapping mandates, institutional rivalry, limited technological capacity, and weak integration of intelligence systems, all of which reduce the effectiveness of border security operations (Ojo & Aghedo, 2022).

Effective security governance requires alignment between strategic objectives and implementation capacity, including adequate resources, trained personnel, and real-time data systems (UNODC, 2023). Where such alignment is absent, governance frameworks risk becoming formal structures with limited impact on actual crime control outcomes, as observed at several Nigerian land borders.

Empirical studies consistently demonstrate that cross-border organised crime is deeply entrenched at Nigeria's south-western land borders, particularly at Seme and Idi-Roko. Using survey data and key informant interviews, Oladejo (2022) examined patterns of trans-border crime in these border communities and found that human trafficking, vehicle smuggling, fuel smuggling, and the movement of contraband goods were the most prevalent

criminal activities. The study reported that over 60 per cent of respondents in Seme acknowledged awareness of human trafficking operations within their communities, while more than 50 per cent identified smuggling networks as operating openly along informal border routes. These findings indicate a high level of crime normalisation and community exposure to organised criminal activities.

Similarly, a quantitative and qualitative investigation by Jimba et al. (2023) documented extensive human trafficking networks operating across the Nigeria–Benin corridor, with Seme and Idi-Roko identified as key transit points. Their analysis of trafficking cases recorded by NAPTIP between 2018 and 2022 revealed a steady increase in cross-border trafficking incidents, particularly involving women and children, despite intensified border enforcement measures. The authors argue that weak institutional coordination and limited intelligence sharing among border agencies significantly reduce the effectiveness of crime control efforts.

Further empirical evidence from a trans-border crime dataset compiled by Oladejo (2022) identifies six dominant categories of organised crime at Seme and Idi-Roko: fuel smuggling, human trafficking, vehicle smuggling, arms trafficking, drug trafficking, and customs evasion. The study shows that smuggling-related offences accounted for approximately 48 per cent of recorded border crime incidents, while human trafficking represented 22 per cent, underscoring the economic and security dimensions of organised crime in the area.

While these studies provide valuable insights into the types, patterns, and scale of organised crime at Seme and Idi-Roko, they largely focus on crime prevalence and community perceptions.

There remains a notable gap in the literature regarding how existing security governance frameworks shape these outcomes. Specifically, limited empirical attention has been paid to evaluating the effectiveness of inter-agency coordination, institutional design, and governance processes in reducing organised crime at these borders. This study addresses this gap by moving beyond crime mapping to systematically assess how security governance frameworks operate in practice and why they have struggled to produce sustained reductions in cross-border organised crime.

Theoretical Anchorage

This study is anchored in governance theory and securitisation theory in order to provide a critical and multidimensional understanding of border security and organised crime control. Governance theory, as articulated by Elke Krahmann in 2003 and further developed by Mark Bevir in 2013, conceptualises border security not as the exclusive responsibility of a single state agency, but as a collective and networked endeavour involving multiple institutions, actors, and levels of authority.

In the context of land borders such as Seme and Idi-Roko, this perspective is particularly useful because border control functions are distributed among several agencies, including customs, immigration, law enforcement, and specialised anti-trafficking bodies. Governance theory draws attention to how coordination mechanisms, institutional mandates, accountability structures, and resource distribution shape policy implementation and outcomes. Critically, it also highlights the risks of fragmentation and inefficiency when roles overlap or when coordination is weak, a condition frequently observed in border security systems in developing states (Ojo & Aghedo, 2022).

However, governance theory alone does not fully explain why certain security threats receive sustained policy attention while others remain inadequately addressed. To address this limitation, the study also draws on securitisation theory, which emphasises the political and discursive processes through which issues are framed as security threats that justify extraordinary measures and resource mobilisation (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). From this perspective, organised crime at borders becomes a policy priority not simply because of its objective impact, but because political actors successfully construct it as an existential threat to national security and economic stability. In the Nigerian context, fluctuating political commitment to border security and organised crime control reflects uneven securitisation, where periods of heightened attention such as border closures or major seizures are often followed by policy fatigue and declining enforcement intensity (Ewi & Aning, 2021).

Through the combination of governance and securitisation theories, this paper critically examines how institutional design, coordination dynamics, and political prioritisation interact to influence crime control outcomes at Seme and Idi-Roko. While governance arrangements may formally exist, their effectiveness is contingent on sustained political commitment, adequate resourcing, and coherent threat framing. The integrated theoretical approach therefore enables a deeper understanding of why security governance frameworks often struggle to translate policy intentions into measurable reductions in cross-border organised crime.

3. Analysis of the Effectiveness of Security Governance Frameworks at Seme and Idi-Roko Borders

The effectiveness of existing security governance frameworks in controlling cross-border organised crime at the Seme and Idi-Roko borders can be critically assessed through the combined lenses of governance theory and securitisation theory. Empirical evidence suggests that while Nigeria has established formal multi-agency governance arrangements at these borders, their practical impact on reducing organised crime remains limited and uneven (Economic Community of West African States 2018)

From a governance theory perspective, border security at Seme and Idi-Roko is structured around networked governance involving the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Nigeria Police Force, NAPTIP, and other security actors. In principle, such multi-actor arrangements should enhance effectiveness through coordination, information sharing, and joint operations (Krahmann, 2003). However, studies like Oladejo (2022) demonstrates that overlapping mandates among border agencies frequently result in duplication of efforts, jurisdictional disputes, and gaps in enforcement, which organised criminal networks exploit. Rather than functioning as an integrated system, agencies often operate in silos, reducing collective capacity to disrupt smuggling and trafficking networks.

Governance theory also emphasises implementation capacity as a determinant of effectiveness. At Seme and Idi-Roko, limited surveillance infrastructure, inadequate logistics, and insufficient personnel constrain enforcement operations, particularly along informal crossing routes (Ojo & Aghedo, 2022). These weaknesses explain why empirical data continue to show high levels of fuel smuggling, vehicle trafficking, and human

trafficking despite the physical presence of multiple security agencies (Jimba et al., 2023). From this standpoint, the governance framework exists largely at a formal level but lacks the operational coherence required to translate policy intent into sustained crime reduction.

Securitisation theory provides further insight into why governance frameworks have produced modest outcomes. Securitisation theory argues that security effectiveness depends on how threats are politically constructed and prioritised, influencing resource allocation and policy urgency (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). In Nigeria, cross-border organised crime is intermittently securitised, often following high-profile seizures or political directives such as temporary border closures. While such moments generate short-term enforcement surges, they are rarely institutionalised into long-term governance reforms (Ewi & Aning, 2021). As political attention shifts, enforcement intensity declines, allowing criminal networks to adapt and resume operations.

The selective securitisation of border crime also affects governance consistency. Human trafficking and arms smuggling tend to receive stronger rhetorical attention than fuel smuggling and customs evasion, despite the latter accounting for significant revenue losses (UNODC, 2023). This uneven threat framing results in skewed resource distribution, weakening comprehensive crime control. Consequently, governance frameworks are reactive rather than preventive, focusing on episodic enforcement rather than sustained disruption of organised crime structures.

Taken together, the theoretical analysis suggests that existing security governance frameworks at Seme and Idi-Roko are partially effective but structurally constrained. Governance theory

reveals systemic coordination and capacity deficits, while securitisation theory explains fluctuating political commitment and inconsistent prioritisation. Although the frameworks have achieved tactical successes, such as seizures and arrests, they have not produced sustained reductions in cross-border organised crime. Effective control would require deeper institutional integration, stable political prioritisation, and governance reforms that align strategic intent with operational capacity. Without these changes, organised crime networks are likely to continue adapting faster than the governance structures designed to contain them.

Table 1: Analysis of Security Governance Operations at Selected Border Posts (2021–2025)

Border Post	Period	Seizures / Interceptions	Revenue Generated (₦)	Trade Facilitation / Other Metrics
Seme	2021 (Annual Overview)	Interception of smuggled rice, poultry products, petroleum products, and narcotics following border reopening	₦743,728,652 (selected operational reports)	Gradual resumption of legitimate trade after partial border closure
Seme	2022 (Annual Overview)	Seizures of foreign parboiled rice, cannabis sativa, used vehicles, second-hand clothing	₦1.8 billion (duty-paid value of seizures)	Increased joint border patrols and anti-smuggling operations
Seme	2023 (Jan–Dec)	Thousands of bags of rice, petroleum products, arms/ammunition, narcotics	₦2.6 billion (seizure value)	Strengthened inter-agency collaboration and export monitoring
Seme	2024 (Jan–Dec)	Large consignments of rice, PMS, cannabis, used	₦3.2 billion (combined revenue & seizure value)	Increased non-oil export processing under AfCFTA commitments

Border Post	Period	Seizures / Interceptions	Revenue Generated (₦)	Trade Facilitation / Other Metrics
		tyres, textile materials	reports)	
Seme	May–June 2025	2,800 bags of foreign rice, 250 bales of second-hand clothing, cannabis, other contraband; total seizure value ₦1.27 billion	₦1,593,676,123.26	
Seme	Late 2025	1,104 parcels of cannabis sativa, 120 packs of Tramadol, 2,043 bags of foreign rice, 150 bales of second-hand clothing; total duty-paid value ~₦2 billion	—	—
Seme	May–June 2025	—	—	2,029 export trucks carrying 88,000 MT of Nigerian goods
Idiroko	2021 (Annual Overview)	Seizures of rice, petrol (PMS), used vehicles, cannabis	₦98 million (approx.)	Border monitoring intensified following land border reopening
Idiroko	2022 (Jan–Dec)	Interception of rice, textile materials, petroleum products	₦145 million (approx.)	Increased surveillance and anti-smuggling enforcement
Idiroko	2023 (Jan–Dec)	Cannabis sativa, rice, vehicles, second-hand clothing	₦173 million (approx.)	Enhanced collaboration with NDLEA and Immigration
Idiroko	2024 (Jan–Dec)	Rice, PMS, narcotics, vehicles	₦162 million (approx.)	Deployment of scanning and risk-management mechanisms
Idiroko	Jan–Sep 2025	5,664 parcels of cannabis sativa, 7,052 bags of rice, 50 bales of clothing, 4,406 litres of petrol,	₦189,549,118 (~₦21 million/month average)	—

Border Post	Period	Seizures / Interceptions	Revenue Generated (₦)	Trade Facilitation / Other Metrics
		11 vehicles, other contraband		

Sources: Nigeria Customs Service (2021); Guardian Nigeria (2025), ICIR Nigeria (2025)

Observations for Analysis (2021–2025 Trend)

Rising seizure values at Seme (2021–2024) suggest intensified enforcement and improved valuation processes (Nigeria Customs Service 2021). 2025 data show both enforcement and trade facilitation roles, especially with export volumes (88,000 MT) reflecting AfCFTA-linked corridor activity (ICIR Nigeria (2025).

Idiroko shows moderate but steady enforcement outcomes, with narcotics and rice consistently dominant in seizures (Guardian Nigeria 2025). The combination of revenue generation and seizure valuation provides a useful proxy for evaluating security governance effectiveness at land borders (Guardian Nigeria 2025).

Large seizures at Seme (~₦1–2 billion), coordinated inter-agency operations, and simultaneous trade facilitation (88,000 MT exports) demonstrate partial effectiveness of governance frameworks. However, persistent contraband volumes and lower revenue/seizure figures at Idi-Roko suggest enforcement gaps, resource constraints, and continued reliance on informal routes (Nigeria Customs Service 2021).




Figure 1: Figure Seizure comparison

Source: Guardian Nigeria (2025)




Figure 2 Seizure Value Comparison

Source: (Guardian Nigeria; 2025; Nigeria Customs Service 2021).

Figures 1 and 2 show the effectiveness of security governance at seme and Idi-roko borders.

Since Seme's revenue is in the billions while Idiroko's is in the millions, this chart uses two separate y-axes to make the individual trends of both border posts clearly visible. This chart uses a single scale to demonstrate the significant difference in economic volume between the two border posts.

Seme Border Post: Shows a consistent upward trajectory from ₦743 million in 2021 to ₦3.2 billion in 2024. The 2025 partial data (May–June) already shows ₦1.59 billion in revenue

Idiroko Border Post: Revenue and seizure values grew from ₦98 million in 2021 to ₦173 million in 2023, with 2025 (Jan–Sep) reaching ₦189.5 million, surpassing previous annual totals despite being a partial report (Guardian Nigeria; 2025)

Discussion of Finding

The study highlights overlapping mandates and weak collaboration among border security agencies at Seme and Idi-Roko. It is recommended that a formalised coordination mechanism, such as a permanent multi-agency task force with clear roles and joint operational protocols, be established. Regular joint planning meetings, shared intelligence systems, and unified reporting channels would help reduce duplication and enhance operational coherence (Ojo & Aghedo, 2022; Ewi & Aning, 2021).

Limited personnel, surveillance technology, and operational equipment constrain enforcement effectiveness, particularly at Idi-Roko. Authorities should prioritise investment in border infrastructure, including CCTV systems, scanners, patrol vehicles, and training for customs and immigration officers. Expanding human and technological capacity would improve detection rates and reduce illicit flows (Oladejo, 2022; UNODC, 2023).

Political attention to organised crime is currently episodic, often triggered by high-profile seizures. To sustain effectiveness, cross-border crime should be institutionally recognised as a continuous security priority, with dedicated funding, performance

benchmarks, and accountability mechanisms. This would mitigate reactive enforcement and support long-term crime reduction strategies (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; Jimba et al., 2023).

The study finds that fragmented intelligence reduces operational effectiveness. A centralised database and real-time information-sharing platform among agencies would enhance the ability to track smuggling patterns, human trafficking networks, and contraband movement. Leveraging analytics can improve predictive enforcement and resource deployment (Ewi & Aning, 2021; UNODC, 2023).

High levels of public awareness of organised crime at the borders indicate normalisation of illicit activities. Implementing community outreach programs to educate border residents about the consequences of trafficking, smuggling, and collaboration with criminal networks can reduce complicity and improve reporting of illegal activities. Partnerships with local stakeholders can also strengthen intelligence networks at the grassroots level (Jimba et al., 2023; Oladejo, 2022).

It indicates that although formal governance structures are established at the Seme and Idi-Roko borders, their effectiveness in controlling cross-border organised crime is constrained by both structural and operational weaknesses. Governance theory posits that the mere existence of institutional frameworks is insufficient; the effectiveness of such structures depends on coordinated action, clearly defined roles, and accountability mechanisms (Krahmann, 2003; Bevir, 2013). At Seme, for example, while multi-agency arrangements involving the Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, NAPTIP, and the Nigeria Police Force exist, enforcement outcomes remain partial. The study's empirical data show that despite seizures valued at over

₦1–2 billion and significant trade facilitation activity, residents report high familiarity with smuggling and human trafficking networks, suggesting that organised crime remains visible and active (Nairametrics, 2025; Jimba et al., 2023). Similarly, at Idi-Roko, seizure volumes are substantial but revenue generation is comparatively low (₦189,549,118), indicating that enforcement capacity and operational reach are limited, likely due to resource constraints, fewer formal trade routes, and extensive informal crossings (ICIR Nigeria, 2025).

The findings also resonate with securitisation theory, which emphasizes how the framing of threats and the allocation of political attention shape enforcement priorities and resource deployment (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; Ewi & Aning, 2021). The study finds that some agencies prioritise regulatory or revenue collection functions over collaborative crime control. For instance, customs enforcement at Seme often focuses on revenue and trade facilitation, while anti-trafficking or intelligence-led operations are inconsistently coordinated. This uneven prioritisation contributes to the persistence of illicit flows, as criminal networks adapt to enforcement gaps. Moreover, the sporadic securitisation of border crime such as intensified enforcement during high-profile seizures or temporary border closures fails to institutionalise long-term deterrence, reflecting the limitations of threat framing in practice

Conclusion and recommendations

The study demonstrates that while governance frameworks guiding border security at Seme and Idi-Roko are formally established, their real-world effectiveness remains uneven. Persistent coordination gaps among agencies, resource constraints, overlapping institutional mandates, and inconsistent

prioritisation of security threats continue to limit their impact on cross-border organised crime. Drawing on insights from governance theory and securitisation perspectives, the analysis shows that the mere existence of multi-agency arrangements does not guarantee effectiveness; what matters is how well these arrangements are implemented, aligned, and sustained over time.

In practical terms, fragmented institutional interactions weaken intelligence sharing, duplication of roles creates inefficiencies, and selective threat framing distorts operational focus. These issues collectively reduce the capacity of border security systems to respond proactively to organised criminal networks, which are themselves adaptive and transnational. The study therefore reinforces the argument that effective border governance requires not only institutional plurality but also coherence, clarity of roles, and strategic coordination.

Ultimately, the findings highlight that strong institutional design must be matched with sustained political will, adequate funding, and accountability mechanisms. Without these, governance frameworks risk remaining symbolic rather than transformative. Achieving measurable reductions in cross-border organised crime will depend on the ability of the Nigerian state and its partners to move from fragmented implementation toward integrated and performance-driven security governance.

Recommendations

To address the structural, operational, and political constraints identified, the following measures are proposed:

Strengthen Inter-Agency Coordination Mechanisms: There is a need to institutionalise clear coordination structures among border security agencies. This should include unified command frameworks, joint task forces, and regular inter-agency briefings to reduce duplication and enhance operational synergy. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities will minimise jurisdictional conflicts and improve response efficiency.

Establish Robust Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Systems: Agencies should adopt systematic monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, including performance audits, feedback loops, and impact assessments. These tools will support evidence-based decision-making, ensure accountability, and enable timely adjustments to border security strategies.

Enhance Resource Allocation and Capacity Building: Effective governance requires adequate human, financial, and technological resources. Investment in surveillance technologies, border infrastructure, and personnel training particularly in intelligence gathering and data analysis will significantly improve operational effectiveness.

Clarify Institutional Mandates and Legal Frameworks: Overlapping mandates should be addressed through policy and legal reforms that clearly delineate agency responsibilities. Harmonising existing laws and operational guidelines will reduce ambiguity and strengthen institutional accountability.

Improve Intelligence Sharing and Information Systems: The development of integrated intelligence platforms accessible to all relevant agencies is critical. Real-time data sharing and coordinated intelligence analysis will enhance the ability to detect and disrupt organised criminal activities across borders.

Ensure Consistent Threat Prioritisation: Security agencies should adopt a unified framework for threat assessment to avoid inconsistencies in securitisation. This will ensure that resources and attention are directed toward the most significant and emerging threats, rather than being influenced by institutional biases or political considerations.

Promote Political Commitment and Oversight: Sustained political will is essential for effective governance reform. Government authorities should provide strategic leadership, ensure policy continuity, and strengthen oversight mechanisms to monitor the performance of border security institutions.

Foster Regional and Cross-Border Collaboration: Given the transnational nature of organised crime, stronger collaboration with neighbouring countries and regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States is essential. Joint operations, shared intelligence, and harmonised border policies will enhance collective security outcomes.

Taken together, these recommendations aim to move governance frameworks beyond partial effectiveness toward a more integrated, accountable, and adaptive system. If properly implemented, they can significantly enhance the capacity to reduce cross-border organised crime at Seme and Idi-Roko and provide a model for broader border security reform in Nigeria.

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